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THE LATEST CHAPTER IN THE SAGA OF A
SPIRITLESS LAW: DETAINING HAITIAN ASYLUM
SEEKERS AS A VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT AND THE
LETTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
MICHAEL ROWAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Indifference is always the friend of the enemy... The political
prisoner in his cell, the hungry children, the homeless refugees-not to
respond to their plight, not to relieve their solitude by offering them a
spark of hope is to exile them from human memory. And in denying
their humanity we betray our own.
- Elie Wiesel'
What experience and history teach is this-that people and
governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on
principles deduced from it.
- G.W. Hegel
2
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004; B.A., Geneva College 2000; Senior Articles Editor,
Florida State University Law Review. The author was a human rights fellow for the Refugee
and Immigrant Center for Legal Services (RAICES) in San Antonio, TX during the Summer
of 2003 and will be law clerk to the Honorable Judge John Antoon II in the District Court for
the Middle District of Florida beginning in September 2004. The author thanks Terry Coonan
for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article and, more importantly, for his example
both as a lawyer and as a human being. This author also wishes to acknowledge Sr.
Charmaine Krohe, Fr. Bob Bums, John Blatz, Auret Van Heerden, Steven Gey and others for
whom human rights is far more than an academic exercise; I can only hope to profit from their
example. Finally, the author thanks the editing staff of MARGINS and especially Matt
Fogelson for their efforts in preparing this article for publication. All errors in this draft are,
of course, my own.
1. Speech, The Perils of Indifference: Lessons Learned from a Violent Century (April
12, 1999), http://www.pbs.org/eliewiesel/resources/millennium.html.
2. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 49 (J. Sibree trans., P.F. Collier and Son
rev. ed., 1901) (1837).
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Despite what political rhetoric might otherwise suggest, 3 the
United States has not always been a haven for the oppressed. To
illustrate this, one need not look any further than the application of
U.S. immigration policy to Haitians. Notwithstanding strong evidence
that political oppression within Haiti is one of the principal causes of
Haitian migration, the U.S. has nonetheless sought to deter it through
two policies: interdiction and detention. This Comment focuses on the
latter policy. It contends that, as with interdiction, the U.S. detention
policy violates both basic humanitarian norms as well as the plain
letter of international law.
Part II of this Comment provides a short overview of Haitian
history, emphasizing the human rights abuses that have taken place in
Haiti since the U.S. began to interdict and detain Haitian refugees.
Part III briefly discusses the humanitarian origins of the Refugee
Convention and the U.S. Refugee Act. Part III also explains the U.S.
policy of detaining Haitian asylum seekers and demonstrates how their
detention runs afoul of basic humanitarian norms. Part IV then
assesses this policy from an international law perspective, concluding
3. See, e.g., Terry Coonan, America Adrift: Refoulement on the High Seas, 63 U. CIN.
L. REv. 1241, 1241 (1995) ("The United States' commitment to human rights principles and
treaties is never so fervent as in election years."). Prof. Coonan cites three examples to
illustrate his point: "Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land.., here as a
refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe free? Jews and Christians
enduring persecution behind the Iron Curtain, the boat people of Southeast Asia, Cuba, and of
Haiti .... Text of Reagan's Speech Accepting the Republicans' Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
July 18, 1980, at A8 (quoting Ronald Reagan under whose administration the policies of
interdiction and detention as a means to deter migration were first implemented).
America is never wholly herself unless she is engaged in high moral
principle. We as a people have such a purpose .... It is to make kinder
the face of the nation and gentler the face of the world .... Great nations
like great men must keep their word. When America says something,
America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a vow made on
marble steps.
Transcript of Bush's Inaugural Address: 'Nation Stands Ready to Push On', N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1989, at A 10 (quoting George Bush's 1989 inaugural address). Bush's interdiction policy
is discussed in Part III. "I am appalled by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up
fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before considering their
claim to political asylum. This process must not stand." Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home;
The Two Clintons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at A17 (quoting Bill Clinton during his 1992
campaign). After the election, Clinton abandoned his emotionally-charged opposition to the
Bush policy and implemented a "warmed-over" Bush policy. See Bill Frelick, Haitian Boat
Interdiction and Return: First Asylum and First Principles of Refugee Protection, 26
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 675, 688 (1993). In a radio address to Haiti in which he announced his
plans to continue the policy of interdiction, President-elect Clinton remarked: "I fear that boat
departures in the near future would result in further tragic losses of life .... For this reason,
the practice of returning those who flee Haiti will continue, for the time being, after I become
President." Id.
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that detention of asylum seekers violates a number of international
laws. Yet as Part V discusses, under the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Jeanty v. Bulger,4 breaches of international law and humanitarian
norms appear to be irrelevant under U.S. immigration law. Against
this background, Part VI concludes this Comment by contending that
the U.S. ought to make international law and its corresponding
humanitarian norms not merely relevant, but essential to its refugee
policy.
II. A HISTORY OF ABUSE
The Refugee Convention 5 and the Refugee Act define
"refugee" to include those persons escaping "persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion." 6  Thus, a convenient and often-utilized
explanation for the U.S.'s harsh Haitian migration policy is that
Haitian migrants are not political refugees as defined by the Refugee
Convention but are merely economic migrants.7 This explanation,
however, is simply not supported by Haitian history.
A. The Bloody Legacy of the Duvaliers
In 1957, Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier assumed power in
Haiti, marking the beginning of nearly three decades of his, and later
his son Jean-Claude's, brutal totalitarian rule. The mood of their
regime may have been best captured by a prayer that the elder
Duvalier required of all Haitians: "Our Doc, who art in the National
Palace, hallowed be thy name, by present and future generations. Thy
8will be done in Port-au-Prince, as it is in the provinces." Indeed, the
will of the Duvaliers was usually done, often through the efforts of the
Haitian secret police, the Tonton Macoutes, who arbitrarily arrested,
4. 204 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2002), affd321 F.3d 1336 (llth Cir. 2003).
5. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2003).
7. The first President Bush, for instance, defended his policy on Haitian migration as
"a fair policy," since the law "does make a distinction between economic refugees and
political refugees." Al Kamen, Bush Defends Policy on Return of Haitians, WASH. POST, Nov.
21, 1991, at A36.
8. Michael Glover, Monsters in depth-Michael Glover gets to know Idi Amin, 'Baby
Doc' and Bokassa, FINANCIAL TiMES, Jan. 18, 2003, at 5.
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tortured, and killed untold numbers of Haitians.9 By 1986, the year in
which Jean-Claude Duvalier was removed from power, the Duvalier
regime's murder victims alone were estimated to be in the range of
thirty to sixty thousand.'0
B. Aristide: The Fading Promise of Change
Many saw the election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in
1990 as a sign of hope that Haiti might finally function as a free and
democratic society." Seven months into his term, however, the
military ousted Aristide, precipitating a return to repressive
government.12 As a result, thousands of Haitians fled their country to
escape persecution.13
In 1994, the U.S., backed by the United Nations, intervened to
restore the democratically elected Aristide government.' 4  Thus far,
however, Aristide's return to power has not been the answer to Haiti's
problems. To the contrary, the Aristide government and its supporters,
the Fanmi Lavalas Party, have not only failed to protect Haitian
citizens from rival political factions but have, like earlier regimes,
committed their own abuses as well. 15
C. Haiti's "Deteriorating" Situation
In September 2001, Amnesty International reported that human
rights violations in Haiti were "more serious . . . than at any point
since the return of Aristide."' 6  The U.S. Department of State
9. See Elizabeth Harris, Economic Refugees: Unprotected in the United States by
Virtue of an Inaccurate Label, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 269, 278 (1993).
10. Id.at278n.61.
11. Women's Commission for Refugee Women & Children, REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT:
THE UNITED STATES AND DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DENY HAITIANS PROTECTION 5 (2003)
[hereinafter REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT]; A Ray of Hope for Haiti, THE RECORD, December 20,
1990, at B6 ("With his election, there is finally hope for the hemisphere's poorest, most
isolated country, following three terrible decades of dictatorship and three years of failed
elections and coups.").
12. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 5.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id
16. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HAITI: STEPS FORWARD, STEPS BACK: HUMAN RIGHTS 10
YEARS AFTER THE COUP 1 (Sept. 2001); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HAITI: TEN YEARS
AFTER THE COUP, SOME HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS LOST (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter TEN
YEARS AFTER THE COUP], http://web.amnesty.org/librarylindex/
MARGINS
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confirmed this assessment in its 2001 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices, declaring that "[t]he [Haitian] Government continued
to commit serious abuses during the year, and its generally poor
human rights record worsened. 1 7 The State Department documented
a range of human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings by the
Haitian National Police (HNP), illegal and arbitrary arrests, and the
suppression of various forms of political opposition.' 8  Further, as
Amnesty International warned in its 2001 report, the failure of the
Aristide government to adequately curb its own abuses and restore
democratic order in Haiti has since led to "more serious violations of
human rights."' 9
In its latest report, issued in March 2003, the State Department
described the situation in Haiti as essentially unchanged from its
dismal state in 2001.20 The report indicated that the Aristide
government and its supporters-including local governments and
paramilitary groups--continued to target their political opposition and,
in so doing, further destabilized the country:
The Government's human rights record remained poor,
with political and civil officials implicated in serious
abuses. There were credible reports of killings by
members of the HNP. Police officers used excessive-
and sometimes deadly-force in making arrests or
controlling demonstrators and were rarely punished for
such acts. Attacks on journalists and political
dissenters by Fanmi Lavalas [FL] supporters continued
21
Locally elected officials allied with the FL increasingly
exercised unauthorized law enforcement functions. The
mayors of Hinche, Maissade, Miragoane, and Petit
Goave employed small paramilitary groups to victimize
engamr360032001?open&of=ENG-HTl (last visited on November 25, 2003) (on file with
MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
17. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2001
2869 (Apr. 2002) [hereinafter 2001 STATE DEP'T REPORT].
18. See id.
19. TEN YEARS AFTER THE COUP, supra note 16.
20. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES -2002 (Mar.
2003) [hereinafter 2002 STATE DEP'T REPORT], http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/
18335.htm (last visited November 20, 2003).
21. Id.
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and control local populations. These groups engaged in
torture, property damage, and theft, and were usually
better armed than local police. In rural areas, members
and agents of CASEC's illegally assumed police
functions such as serving warrants, arresting the
accused, taking testimony (often for a fee), and seizing
private property. Locally elected officials often abused
citizens based on perceived political disloyalty .... 22
Additionally, the strategy of pro-government forces to maintain
their power through paramilitary groups--or local "gangs"-has
begun to backfire.23 For example, in August 2002, Amiot Cubain
Metayer, an ex-Aristide supporter and leader of the militant gang
known as the "Cannibal Army," 24 escaped from prison along with 150
other prisoners. 25  At the time of his escape, Metayer was serving a
sentence for burning down the homes of Aristide opposition members.
Once jailed, however, he withdrew his support for Aristide.26
Following his escape, Metayer joined with other anti-Aristide forces in
calling for a nationwide uprising against the Haitian government.
27
While their ultimate aim was not realized, protesters occupied the city
of Gonaives and successfully resisted the efforts of the government to
22. 2001 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 17 at 2872; see generally Matthew Hay
Brown, Hard Times Hinder Haiti: Day by Day Aristide's Opposition Grows Stronger as
Foreign Aid Remains Out of Reach, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., March 9, 2003, at GI
(reporting that "Aristide's supporters have broken up opposition demonstrations, and the
government is accused of funding and arming political gangs to rally support and intimidate
dissent. The U.S. Committee for Refugees counted more than 150 'political murders,
suspicious disappearances or deaths, and quasi-political gangland slayings' in Haiti this past
year.").
23. See generally Letta Tayler, Critics Blame Aristide for Rise of Guns, Gangs; Haitian
leadership fights allegations of ties to armed groups, NEWSDAY, Sept. 8, 2002, at A18
(reporting that militants who support the government are losing the control they once had).
24. The "Cannibal Army" was a Gonaives-based gang once reputed for its violent
attacks on opposition to the Aristide government. David Gonzales, World Briefing Americas:
Haiti: Pro-Aristide Gang Leader Found Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at A1O. The gang
has since changed its name to the "Army of the Gonaives Resistance." Raymond Joseph,
Pressure Grows for Change in Haiti, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 10, 2003, at 6. Metayer was discovered
slain on Sept. 22, 2003, giving rise to a new wave of resistance against the Aristide
government. See id.
25. Escaped Leader Accuses Haiti Head, BBC NEWS, August 3, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2171065.stm. (last visited on November 25, 2003) (on file
with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
26. Michael Norton, Police Call for Uprising in Haiti: Police Fire Tear Gas, Live
Ammo, SuN-SENTINEL, Aug. 6, 2002, at 10A.
27. Id.
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restore order. 8 Until his death,29 Metayer remained at large, "a clear
indication of the extent to which basic Haitian institutions have
weakened.
30
As tensions between rival factions continue to escalate, the
threat to average Haitian citizens also appears to be increasing. 31 The
following account suggests that even political neutrality does not
necessarily guarantee one's safety in Haiti:
Andy Philippe wasn't a rich man or political
activist. He was only 20 years old, a hard-working
father with little money and a few strong opinions.
That's why Philippe opened the door when three
hooded, heavily armed men in police uniforms arrived
at his small house on a Sunday morning this month.
Because he wasn't a gadfly or some well-to-do
entrepreneur, Philippe told his two brothers, they didn't
have anything to fear from the police.
And that's why, when all three were found dead
with gunshot wounds to the head hours later, their
families and friends were shocked that they had become
targets. The dead men weren't journalists, judges,
politicians or intellectuals-the most common targets in
Haiti's political disarray-but ordinary victims in a
new wave of violence carried out by what human rights
activists describe as police death squads.
32
28. Id.
29. Raymond Joseph, Pressure Grows for Change in Haiti, N.Y. SUN, Oct. 10, 2003, at
6.
30. Norton, supra note 26.
31. See, e.g., Tim Collie, Murder in Haiti: 'Zero Tolerance' Policy Has Meant Bodies
Piling Up, The Victims of Summary Executions, SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 22, 2002, at lA; see also
Amnesty International, Haiti Abuse of Human Rights: Political Violence as the 200th
Anniversary of Independence Approaches [hereinafter Abuse of Human Rights],
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr360072003 (describing the predicament of
farmers who in merely approaching the police or military are perceived as "assailants") (last
visited October 16, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race,
Religion, Gender and Class).
32. Collie, supra note 31. whether these men and other death squad victims would
qualify within one of the requisite grounds for receiving asylum is unclear. See 8 U.S.C
1101 (a)(42) (2003) (stating that persecution must be "on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion," but it is not clear why the death
squad victims were persecuted). Much of the reason that we cannot be certain, however, has
to do with a U.S. refugee policy that deters such individuals from ever making their cases for
asylum in the first place. See infra part II.B-C.
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A number of conclusions may thus be drawn regarding Haiti's
recent political history. First, based on the reports of the State
Department as well as Amnesty International, human rights abuses are
prevalent in Haiti. Second, it is likely that the political violence in
Haiti will continue to increase. Third, it is more than just "common
targets" that bear the brunt of the abuses-.ordinary people, in addition
to journalists, judges, politicians and intellectuals, are being
persecuted. Finally, at best, the Aristide government is either unable
or unwilling to stop the atrocities being committed; at worst, it is
directly responsible. In either case, Haitians have little prospect for
relief within their own country.
D. A Search for "Better (Economic) Opportunities?"
A standard argument for denying refuge to Haitians is that they
are economic rather than political refugees. 33 For instance, the State
Department describes the migration of Haitians as one in which "[a]n
unknown number of undocumented migrants [leave] the country by
sea or land to seek better economic opportunities."34 This argument is
premised on the definition of "refugee" which, in both the Protocol as
well the Refugee Act, does not include coverage for those seeking
economic refuge. 35  In other words, assuming that Haitians are
economic migrants, the U.S. is not in violation of its obligation.
However, this characterization, unqualified as it is, fails to consider
Haiti's recent history. Surely, given the degree of political violence in
Haiti, some Haitian migrants are escaping political rather than, or at
least in addition to, economic oppression. Upon closer examination,
moreover, there is some indication that political oppression is not
merely a factor in Haitian migration but that it is also the most
relevant one.
Coast Guard interdiction statistics reveal that, in 1993 and
1994, during the time that Aristide was ousted and a military junta
ruled Haiti, a relatively large number of Haitians sought refuge in the
33. See Harris, supra note 9, at 278 ("The Carter and Reagan Administrations, like the
Bush and Clinton Administrations, viewed the Haitian refugees as economic migrants"); 2001
STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 17, at 2879-80.
34. 2001 STATE DEP'T REPORT, supra note 17, at 2879 (emphasis added). Curiously, as
the previous section discussed, the State Department proffers this characterization in the very
same report in which it describes the human rights situation in Haiti as "poor." Id.
35. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31. 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.
378 [VOL. 3:371
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U.S.36  Upon Aristide's return to power, that number dropped
significantly.37 Then, after the restored Aristide government proved to
be unstable, Haitians again sought to emigrate in greater numbers.
38
Notably, throughout this period of political flux, Haiti's per capita
income was well below the poverty line including the brief period
during which Aristide was restored to power and Haitian migration
declined.39 Thus, the correlation "between political stability and the
number of people trying to leave Haiti" strongly suggests that
"economic deprivation has not necessarily been the leading factor
causing Haitian migration, as the U.S. government often argues.
40
Sadly, though, the political violence suffered by repatriated
Haitians may be the clearest indicator that Haitian claims of political
persecution are genuine. In the case of one woman forcibly returned
to Haiti, a pro-Famni Lavalas security force beat her with their rifles
until she spit up blood, attacked her brother-in-law in much the same
way, and opened gunfire on her mother's restaurant. In another case,
the Tonton Macoutes murdered a sixteen-year old girl just one day
after her forced return to Haiti.42 Stories such as these43 help to
36. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 9 (In those years, respectively, the Coast
Guard interdicted 4270 and 25,302 Haitians). The report does not list figures for 1991-92, the
first two years during which Aristide was ousted. See id.
37. Id. (The Coast Guard only interdicted 909 Haitians in 1995.).
38. Id. (The number of interdicted Haitians rose to 2,295 in 1996).
39. See Elizabeth Mensch, Silencing the Guns In Haiti, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 915, 920
(1999) (reviewing IRWIN STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GuNs IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997)) ("Haiti has been, and remains, the poorest country in the
Western Hemisphere."); see also WORLD BANK GROUP, CARIBBEAN COUNTRY MANAGEMENT
UNIT, HAITI: THE CHALLENGES OF POVERTY REDUCTION VOLUMES I AND II (Aug. 1998),
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/External/lac/lac.nsf/0/8479e9126e3537f0852567ea000fa239/$F
ILE/Haitil.doc (last visited Nov. 25, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal
on Race, Religion, Gender and Class) ("Although data are limited, something is known about
the characteristics of migrants. Migrants from Haiti to places abroad tend to come from all
income groups except the very poorest, who cannot afford to migrate."). Id. at 11.
40. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 14.
41. Id. at 29-30.
42. Id. at 11.
43. There are, of course, other examples. One article cites examples derived from the
interviews of seventeen Haitians who, after being repatriated to Haiti, returned to the United
States:
One refugee, Simulus Thomas, reported that, two days after his
return, soldiers sought him at his mother's house but left when told that he
was not there. Mr. Thomas had initially fled Haiti after his father, active
in the Aristide political movement Lavalas, had been shot. Mr. Thomas
was later arrested and imprisoned but managed to escape. Other returnees
in his cell had been beaten.
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explain why so many Haitians risk their lives in an effort to reach the
U.S. As one Haitian woman explained: "If I hadn't been trying to
escape persecution, I never would have gotten on that boat. We spent
nine days wet and hungry, and it was a terrible journey, but we had to
do it to save our lives." 4  Such accounts, together with Haiti's recent
history of civil strife, stories of severe persecution, and the strong
correlation between political instability and migration, cast
considerable doubt on the U.S. government's persistent
characterization of Haitians as economic migrants.
.... [T]wo days after a repatriate identified as "Pierre" returned
to his home in Haiti: "Soldiers barraged his house with bullets, killing
Pierre's father within. When the soldiers had arrived, Pierre and his wife
had been behind the house and they hid in the brush. After the rampage, a
neighbor informed Pierre that, as they were leaving, the soldiers
proclaimed that they had come to kill the FNCD delegate who had been
returned."
One woman, designated "Michelle" ... returned home only to
be beaten and arrested by a judge and then incarcerated for a week: "The
military guards in the prison told Michelle that she would be killed
because she had been a member of the FNCD and because she had left
Haiti. While in prison, Michelle was beaten by the guards. After one
week, she was released from prison, without explanation."
When a third repatriate ("Joseph") reached his home in Haiti:
[H]e found that his father and sister had been arrested.
According to one of his friends who had witnessed the arrest from afar,
Joseph's family had been arrested due to the fact that they were family
members of a known Lavalas supporter and repatriate."
A fourth individual ("Henri"):
"[learned from] close friends that the military was searching for
17 persons in his neighborhood who were targeted as Aristide supporters
and as repatriates .... Three days later, soldiers in a white car cameto
Henri's house to arrest him. Henri escaped from his house through a back
window."
Jean-Pierre Benoit & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unsafe Havens, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1461-63
(1992) (citations omitted). Of course, it seems rather safe to presume that, the more human
rights in Haiti deteriorate, the more difficult it is for human rights workers and journalists, as
targets of abuse themselves, to document the frequency with which repatriated Haitians are
subject to persecution. Thus, the precise scale of abuses suffered by repatriated Haitians is
anyone's guess.
44. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 20. Ironically, the present and previous
administrations have been quick to cite the danger involved in the migration from Haiti to the
United States as a reason for various policies deterring Haitian migration; implicit in this
observation, however, should be some recognition of how dangerous it must be for Haitians to
remain in Haiti.
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III. U.S. REFUGEE POLICY-LESSONS UNLEARNED
A. The Humanitarian Origins of the Refugee Convention and the 1980
Refugee Act
Notwithstanding the well-established image of the U.S. as "a
haven for the oppressed," 45 political expediency, rather than
humanitarian obligation, has too often been the dominant force driving
U.S. immigration policy. At no point was this more apparent than in
its response to the Holocaust. As millions of Jews and other
"undesirables" were being systematically murdered by the Nazis, the
U.S. and its allies refused to alter their rigid immigration policies,
leaving those who might have otherwise escaped persecution without
refuge.46
Following the end of World War II, the formation of the United
Nations and its adoption of the Refugee Convention functioned both as
a symbol of the world's humanitarian failures as well as a pledge that
the various sins of the Holocaust would never be repeated. Though
initially it did not sign the Refugee Convention, the U.S. eventually
joined the international community in its humanitarian commitment to
provide refuge to the persecuted.
1. The Tragic Lessons of the Evian Conference and the
"Voyage of the Damned"
At the Evian Conference in 1938, representatives of thirty-two
countries met to discuss Europe's "refugee problem.47  Hitler
encouraged the flight of Jews from Germany and Austria and, to that
end, issued the following challenge to purportedly sympathetic nations
like the U.S.: "We, on our part, are ready to put all these criminals at
45. Barbara Bedzek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of
Citizen Interpretation, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 899, 934 n.126 (1995) ("[F]or most of the nation's
history, the image of the United States as a haven for the oppressed has enjoyed considerable
political vitality, if not unanimity of view . . . . Throughout the nineteenth century, both
Republican and Democratic political parties' platforms invoked the image of the United States
as asylum.").
46. See Esther Rosenfeld, United States Immigration Policy - A History of Prejudice
and Economic Scapegoatism?: Fatal Lessons: United States Immigration Law During the
Holocaust, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'y 249, 264-65 (1995).
47. United Holocaust Memorial Museum website, Evian Conference [hereinafter Evian
Conference], http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/evian.htm (last visited July 29, 2003) (on file
with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
2003]
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[your] disposal . . . for all I care, on luxury ships."48  Ultimately,
however, commitment to domestic and foreign policy concerns
prevailed over humanitarian principle,49 and the U.S. and its "free
world" allies declined Hitler's invitation, opting instead to maintain
rigid immigration quotas.
50
In May 1939, the challenge was posed more directly as nine
hundred Jews set sail aboard the Saint Louis in search of refuge from
Nazi persecution. 51 The passengers attempted to enter Cuba and then
the U.S., but in both instances were turned away.52 Forced to return to
Europe, most of the refugees were eventually murdered in Nazi
concentration camps.5 3 "The Voyage of the Damned," as it came to be
known, symbolized the Holocaust's moral complexity.54 At the same
time that Allied nations celebrated their victory over Nazi brutality,
they were also faced with the horrifying consequences of their own
indifference.5
5
48. World Jewish Congress, Policy Dispatches No. 30, Sixty years since Evian: A
lesson in cold indifference that the world cannot forget (July 1998),
http://wjc.org.il/publications/
policydispatches/pub-dis30.html (quoting Adolph Hitler) (last visited November 26, 2003)
(on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
Hitler prefaced the statement quoted above by saying: 'I can only hope and expect that the
other world, which has such deep sympathy for these criminals, will at least be generous
enough to convert this sympathy into practical aid.' Id.
49. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 256-58 (noting among other things the
Roosevelt Administration's desire to reduce unemployment).
50. See Evian Conference, supra note 47; Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 252 n.24 (noting
that "[t]he quota limited the number of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe to
153,774 a year . . . [that] [t]he number of spaces available to Nazi refugees came to
approximately 53,000..." and that "[b]etween 1938 and 1941, about 212,000 refugees might
have entered the United States, but only 150,000 were able to do so.") (citations omitted).
51. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 255 n.36.
52. Id.
53. United Holocaust Memorial Museum website, Wartime Fate of the Passengers of
the "St. Louis", http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/evian.htm (last visited July 29, 2003) (on file
with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
54. See Marylyn Henry, Voyage of the Damned, JERUSALEM POST, July 21, 1998, at 17.
One holocaust researcher has remarked, for instance, that: "The fate of the 963 [St. Louis
passengers] is a microcosm of the Holocaust." Id.
55. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 250. The end result is common knowledge to even
the most casual student of history: approximately 6 million Jews and "nearly as many other
'undesirables' (Gypsies, homosexuals, leftists, Slavs) [were] systematically slaughtered."
THE LIFE MILLENIUM: THE 100 MOST IMPORTANT EvENTs & PEOPLE OF THE PAST 1,000 YEARS
153 (Robert Friedman ed., 1998).
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2. The World's Response: The Refugee Convention
Realizing their "passive complicity" 56 in what was, perhaps,
"the greatest and most terrible crime ever committed in the whole
history of the world, ' 57 the nations of the world recognized the need to
provide refuge to persons fleeing persecution.58 Accordingly, in 1951,
the United Nations approved the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention).59 It provided that no state "shall
expel or return a refugee in any manner . . . to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion.' '6  In short, the Refugee Convention was an
essentially humanitarian commitment to ensure that the world would
never again be party to another "Voyage of the Damned.'
3. The United States 'Slow but Sure Path to Compliance
The U.S. never ratified the Refugee Convention. In 1968,
however, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Refugee Protocol
(Protocol), which incorporated the terms of the Refugee Convention.62
Then, in 1980, President Jimmy Carter. signed the U.S. Refugee Act
(Refugee Act), bringing the U.S. into full compliance with both the
Refugee Convention and Protocol.63  In signing the Refugee Act,
President Carter remarked that it "reflects our long tradition as a haven
for people uprooted by persecution and political turmoil. In recent
years, the number of refugees has increased greatly. Their suffering
touches all and challenges us to help them, often under difficult
56. This phrase has been used to describe the failure of the free world to respond to the
Jewish plight. See Victoria Barnett, Provocative Reconciliation, 117 THE CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 942 (2001).
57. Press Release, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, America and the Holocaust
(Jan. 6, 2001) (quoting Winston Churchill, who was commenting on the gravity of the Jewish
Holocaust), http://www.feri.org/news/newsdetail.cfi?QID=826 (last visited July 29, 2003)
(on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
58. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 250-251.
59. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
60. Id. at 176.
61. See Rosenfeld, supra note 46, at 264-65.
62. A. Roman Boed, Past Persecution Standards for Asylum Eligibility in the Seventh
Circuit: Bygones are Bygones, 43 DEPAuL L. REv. 147, 155-56 (1993) (noting that President
Lyndon Johnson approved the accession of the United States to the Protocol on October 15,
1968).
63. Id. at 156 (noting that "[t]he United States's statutory definition of a refugee is thus
consistent with the definition adopted by the United Nations in the Convention and
subsequently in the Protocol").
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circumstances." 64 These were not words of political calculation, but
rather a clear expression of the U.S.'s humanitarian commitment.
65
Thus, while the U.S.'s accession was long overdue, it eventually
became a signatory to both the letter as well as the "innately
humanitarian" spirit of the Refugee Convention.
66
Since enacting the Refugee Act, however, the U.S. has failed to
honor its commitment. Instead, the U.S. has only served as a "haven
for the oppressed" to the extent that, through its policies of interdiction
and detention, it has failed to deter those who would otherwise invoke
its protection.
B. Sale v. Haitian Centers Counsel: Precedent for a Spiritless Law
As Part II discussed, political and economic turmoil plagued
Haiti for most of its years as an independent nation. 67  Given its
proximity to Haiti as well as its wealth, political stability, and
reputation as a haven for the oppressed, the U.S. is an obvious
destination point for Haitians seeking refuge. Contrary to its
humanitarian obligation, however, the U.S. response has hardly been
one of accommodation.
6 8
In 1981, President Reagan authorized the interdiction and
return of Haitian refugees attempting to enter the U.S. by sea. 69 To
64. Refugee Act of 1980, Statement on Signing S.B. 643 into Law, 16 WEEKLY COMP.
OF PRES. Docs. 503 (March 18, 1980).
65. See Elwin Griffith, Problems of Interpretation in Asylum and Withholding of
Deportation Proceedings Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 18 Loy. L.A. Int'l &
Comp. L.J. 255, 268 (1996) ("Although Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns
in mind, it is questionable whether the protection of aliens serves only such concerns ....
[T]he statute's primary purpose is to protect human rights .... ").
66. One author describes the nature of the Refugee Convention as follows:
Human rights play a large and visible role in international refugee law. In
fact, the job description of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees explicitly mentions the humanitarian character of the office. It
thus follows that the Refugee Convention is itself innately humanitarian.
After all, the instrument was initially designed to secure the humanitarian
objective of relief for the victims of Nazi persecution.
Kenneth Regensburg, Refugee Law Reconsidered Reconciling Humanitarian Objectives
with the Protectionist Agendas of Western Europe and the United States, 29 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 225, 256-57 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
67. See REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 5; see also infra Part II.
68. See id. at 10.
69. Id. President Reagan's authorization was giver pursuant to a bilateral agreement
that established a cooperative program of interdiction and selective return of Haitian migrants
and vessels with the Haitian government, then led by Jean-Claude Duvalier. Agreement,
Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 UST 3559.
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varying degrees, subsequent administrations, including the present
one, continue to implement this policy. 70  Notably, under the
Kennebunkport Order,71 issued by then-President Bush, the U.S. rarely
screened interdicted Haitians to determine if they were refugees under
international and U.S. law.72 In fact, the Kennebunkport Order, issued
in 1992, specifically stated that determinations of refugee status were
not required.73 In other words, Haitians could be repatriated without
any inquiry into whether their claims of persecution were legitimate.
Thus, it is quite possible that some of those repatriated were returned
to their persecutors as a direct consequence of U.S. immigration
policy.
Nonetheless, in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,74 the Supreme
Court held in an 8-1 decision that interdiction under the
Kennebunkport Order was consistent with the Refugee Convention,
reasoning that, while the U.S. policy may "violate the spirit" of the
Refugee Convention (Article 33), it does not violate the Convention's
express obligations.75  Specifically, the Court held that U.S.
obligations under the Refugee Convention only arise when persons
claim refugee status on American soil.76 Thus, so long as the Coast
Guard intercepted Haitians on the high seas, the U.S. was not
obligated to make refugee status determinations.77  The Court
reasoned, "a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterritorial
70. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 10, 11-13. See also Exec. Order No.
12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (May 24, 1992) [hereinafter Kennebunkport Order]; Susan
Martin et al., Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 543, 553-54 (1998) (discussing Clinton's policy on Haitian migration).
71. Kennebunkport Order, supra note 70, at 23,134. The order stated:
Neither this order nor any agency guidelines, procedures, instructions,
directives, rules or regulations implementing this order shall create or
shall be construed to create any right or benefit, substantive, or procedural
(including without limitation any right or benefit under the Administrative
Procedure Act), legally enforceable by any party against the United
States, its agencies or instrumentalities, officers, employees, or any other
person. Nor shall this order be construed to require any procedure to
determine whether a person is a refugee.
Id. (emphasis added)
72. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 11.
73. Id.
74. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
75. Id. at 183.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 187 ("We do not read that text [Refugee Convention] to apply to aliens
interdicted on the high seas").
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obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general
humanitarian intent."
78
In a lone dissent, Justice Blackmun emphasized the peculiarity
of the U.S. policy and the Court's decision upholding it:
The refugees attempting to escape from Haiti do not
claim a right of admission to this country. They do not
even argue that the Government has no right to
intercept their boats. They demand only that the United
States, land of refugees and guardian of freedom, cease
forcibly driving them back to detention, abuse, and
death.79
Not lost on Blackmun was the haunting parallel of the Haitian
plight to the Jewish refugee experience: "the Convention that the
Refugee Act embodies was enacted largely in response to the
experience of Jewish refugees in Europe during the period of World
War II. The tragic consequences of the world's indifference at that
time are well known. ' 8° Thus, under Blackmun's analysis, the U.S.
policy toward Haitians potentially replicated the humanitarian
embarrassment that gave birth to the Refugee Convention. Indeed, the
policy upheld by the Court would not only have allowed the U.S. in
1939 to resist the entry of Jewish refugees aboard the Saint Louis, but
would have empowered the Coast Guard to affirmatively intercept the
ship and return the passengers to Nazi Germany, regardless of the
consequences.81
78. Id. at 183.
79. Id. at 208.
80. Id. at 207.
81. For its part, the UNHCR also noted the incongruity of the court's decision with
relevant international norms:
[B]locking the flight of refugees and summarily repatriating them to a
place where their lives or freedom would be threatened is contrary to the
applicable international refugee treaties and to the international principle
of "non-return" of refugees. These treaties-1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees- prohibit the involuntary
return of refugees "in any manner whatsoever."
American Society of International Law, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council 1215 (1993) (paraphrasing
the UNCHR's amicus curiae brief filed in Sale ). The UNHCR, like Blackmun, called
attention to the broader, "overriding humanitarian purpose" of international asylum law "to
protect especially vulnerable individuals from persecution;" the UNHCR labelled the court's
decision "a setback to international refugee law... and an unfortunate example." Id.
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Under Sale, then, the only way refugees are absolutely assured
adjudication of their refugee status is to reach American soil without
being detected by the U.S. Coast Guard. 82 It is perhaps of some
consolation that present U.S. policy 83 exceeds the Sale standard by
providing that aliens interdicted at sea who claim a "fear of
persecution" are entitled to a "credible fear" screening. This policy,
however, is ripe with potential for error. First, aliens who are
unacquainted with the nuances of U.S. asylum law might never think,
or are too intimidated, to mention their reasons for leaving Haiti. 85
Second, translators are often unavailable to ascertain whether claims
for asylum are actually being made.86 Thus, because the U.S. does not
adequately screen asylum seekers, it has no way of knowing whether
these refugees will be free from persecution if they are repatriated. 87
Worse yet, the present Bush administration has taken an additional
step to deter Haitian migration. This measure focuses on those
Haitians who, despite the efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard, reach U.S.
soil and thus fall under the protection of international law as
interpreted in Sale.88
82. Sale, 509 U.S. at 155.
83. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 18. For Haitians interdicted on the high
seas, moreover, even a positive determination of refugee status does not necessarily lead to
asylum in the United States. Instead, the refugee is ordinarily resettled in a third country.
This, while preferable to repatriation, may still be a harsh result for those refugees who were
hoping to reunite with family members in the United States. Id. at 19-20.
84. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAITIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS
TARGETED BY DETENTION AND INTERDICTION POLICIES (Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter ASYLUM
SEEKERS TARGETED], www.lchr.org/media/2002_alerts/1106.htm (last visited on Nov. 26,
2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and
Class).
85. See Beate Anna Ort, International and U.S. Obligations Toward Stowaway Asylum
Seekers, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 285, 317 (1991) The article noted that:
[i]n its study of the Haitian interdiction program, the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights found that the shipboard interviews "may not be
private; the Haitians may be hungry, are definitely ill-at-ease and have no
idea why they are being asked questions." The shipboard interviews may
also have been insufficient because "[m]any refugees will only relate what
happened to them to someone with whom they have established a
relationship of trust and confidence. . . . [O]nly indirect probing will
reveal whether the Haitian fears persecution in Haiti. Such indirect
questioning has proven essential in eliciting information from refugees
who ... are unable to express opinions and beliefs for which they have
previously been made to suffer."
Id. (citation omitted).
86. Asylum Seekers Targeted, supra note 84.
87. Id.
88. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council. 509 U.S. 155, 179-188 (1993).
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C. U.S. Refugee Policy. Deterring the Persecuted
1. Post IIAIRA Asylum Process
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIAIRA) 89 to establish a framework for
processing asylum claims. 9° Most significantly, IIAIRA instituted a
system of expedited removal for all persons who illegally arrive in the
U.S., with the exception of Cubans, who have enjoyed exceptional
status under U.S. immigration law since 1966. 9'
Under IIAIRA, immigration officers have the power to order
the removal of aliens without a hearing or any other form of formal
review. 92  However, if an alien claims to fear persecution in her
country of origin, an asylum officer screens the alien to determine
whether she has a "credible fear" of persecution. 93  If the asylum
officer determines that the alien does not have a "credible fear," then
the alien can request a review by an immigration judge.94 The review,
however, must take place within twenty-four hours "whenever
possible" and can never take place later than seven days after the
asylum officer's initial determination. 95  On the other hand, if the
asylum officer determines that the alien does have a "credible fear" of
persecution, then that alien is entitled to a full hearing before an
immigration judge, pursuant to INA section 240.96 At this point, an
89. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 546 (1996) [hereinafter IIRAIRA].
90. Id.; see generally Bo Cooper, Procedures for Expedited Removal and Asylum
Screening Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1501 (1997) (explaining the changes that the IIRAIRA brought to
immigration law).
91. See Cuban Readjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as
amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1255); see generally Charles J. Ogletree Jr., America's Schizophrenic
Immigration Policy: Race, Class, and Reason, 41 B.C. L. REV 755 (2000) (discussing how the
IIRAIRA treats Cubans and Haitians differently).
92. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, COMMENTS OF THE LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ON INS No. 2243-02 NOTICE OF DESIGNATION EXPANSION OF
EXPEDITED REMOVAL TO SEA ARRIVALS 6 (2002) [hereinafter LCHR],
http://www.lchr.org/asylun/comms-onINS_1216.pdf (last visited on Nov. 26, 2003) (on file
with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class); DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., EXPEDITED REMOVAL, [hereinafter INS]
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/lawenfor/bmgmt/inspect/expedhtm (last visited on Nov. 26,
2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and
Class).
93. INS, supra note 92.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [hereinafter INA], Pub L. No. 82-
414, 66 Stat. 163, 182-89 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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INS district director has discretion to release the alien pending her
asylum hearing. 97 The alien's ties to the community, the likelihood
she will appear for future hearing, her health, and whether she may
pose a threat to the community are some of the factors considered in
making this determination. 98  Until recently, asylum-seekers were
typically granted parole so that they could await their hearings in the
care of family or friends. 99 This policy, however, was abandoned, first
with respect to Haitians and then altogether.'
00
2. Detention Without Parole
In December 2001, nearly two hundred Haitian refugees landed
off the coast of Florida. 10 Having reached land, these Haitians were
entitled to adjudication of asylum claims under U.S. refugee law.'0 2
Proceeding under the framework for expedited removal, asylum
officers determined that all but two of the Haitians had a "credible
fear" of persecution.'0 3 Although at the time it was standard for the
INS to parole asylum seekers pending their hearings,' 0 4 the INS
headquarters instructed its Miami district office not to release any of
the Haitians.'
05
The INS action quickly became the subject of criticism.10 6
First, the Bush administration admitted that one aim of its detention
policy was to deter the future migration of Haitians.' ° 7  Like
interdiction, refugee advocates viewed this as inconsistent with
relevant legal standards and humanitarian norms. 10 8 Second, by the
Bush Administration's own admission, the INS policy singled out
Haitians. 10 9 Finally, groups like the Women's Commission focused on
the poor conditions of detention.'
0
97. INS, supra note 92.
98. Id.
99. Wendy Young, INS Policy of Deterrence: Haitian Asylum Seekers in the United
States, REFUGEE REPORTS, Vol. 23 No. 8, at 12, 12, Nov. 2002; see also ASYLUM SEEKERS
TARGETED, supra note 84.
100. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 31.
101. Id. at 20.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 21.
104. Id.
105. id.
106. See, e.g., ASYLUM SEEKERS TARGETED, supra note 84.
107. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 22.
108. See, e.g., REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 3.
109. See id. at 27; Press Release, White House Press Conference by the President (Nov. 7
2002) (transcript of press conference) [hereinafter Bush Press Conference],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/print/20021107-2.html (last visited Nov.
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(a). Deterring the Welcomed? The Paradox of U.S. Refugee
Policy
Present U.S. refugee policy is a paradox. It offers refuge to the
"persecuted" at the same time that it blocks the path of those who seek
such refuge."' In many cases, the only way for the "persecuted" to
receive the protection of U.S. law is to avoid detection by the very
people who enforce the law (i.e., the Coast Guard). 12 Furthermore,
this system of offering protection to the "persecuted" has become even
more bizarre, as INS policy now allows for detention of asylum
applicants in an effort to persuade others not to similarly seek refuge
in the U.S.'
This policy has been justified, in part, by pointing to the
serious risk that Haitians take in traveling to the U.S. by sea. 1 14 This
justification is doubtful, however, considering that the policy has also
been applied to Haitians arriving in the U.S. by plane.' 15 The INS's
official position also clearly states that "[a]ny message that may
encourage a mass migration and detract resources from our homeland
defense is unacceptable."" 6  Statements like these emphasize the
interests of the U.S rather than the safety of the Haitian people. Thus,
leaving possible humanitarian justifications aside, the administration is
enforcing a policy that essentially says: "Give me your tired, your
poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,"' 17 but know that,
if they must come, we will do our very best to stop them; and if they
are fortunate enough to escape the detection of law enforcement
officials and thereby arrive at our shores, they will be placed in
detention centers so that others like them will not be encouraged to
come as well.
26, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and
Class).
110. See REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11 at 22-28.
111. See supra Part III.B.
112. Id.
113. U.S. Affirms Uniform Policy for Illegal Immigrants Arriving by Sea, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Nov. 9, 2002, at A3.
114. Id.
115. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 22.
116. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., STATEMENT: INS
ANNOUNCES NOTICE CONCERNING EXPEDITED REMOVAL (Nov. 8, 2002),
http://uscis.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/statements/expremnoticest.htm
(last visited Nov. 26, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race,
Religion, Gender and Class).
117. Emma Lazarus, "The New Colossus," 1883. This poem is inscribed on the base of
the Statute of Liberty.
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(b). Curing Discrimination in US. Refugee Policy:
You Want Equal Treatment, We'II Give You Equal Treatment
Until recently, another troubling aspect of the U.S. detention
policy was its discriminatory application to Haitians. 1 8  As one
Haitian detainee complained:
[It was] even more difficult for us, to watch so many
other women from other countries come in and quickly
get released. I didn't think the United States would
treat people differently just because of the place they
were born, I thought everyone was equal here. But we
were not treated like everyone else, even though we are
all human and we all have the same blood. It became
clear to us that the only reason we were in jail
indefinitely is because we are Haitian. 
1 9
Advocates for the detainees echoed this concern and demanded
fairer treatment for Haitians. 20 Following the arrival, and subsequent
detention, of a group of Haitian immigrants arriving by boat in 2002,
the Bush Administration finally responded to calls for equal
treatment. 121
President Bush recognized that "immigration laws ought to be
the same for Haitians and everyone else .... ,122 This proved to mean,
though, that rather, than easing the burden on Haitian immigrants, the
policy of detention would be extended to all persons seeking asylum
except Cubans, who would not be subject to the policy since "we [the
United States] don't send people back to Cuba because they . . .
[would be] persecuted."' 123  By this statement, Bush implied that
Haitians would not be persecuted if returned, perhaps reflecting the
118. See, e.g., Alice Gomstyn, US Policy on Haitian Immigrants Assailed, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 1, 2002, at B2.
119. REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11, at 21.
120. See, e.g., ASYLUM SEEKERS TARGETED, supra note 84.
121. See Bush Press Conference, supra note 109.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Dana Canedy, Haitian Detainees Being Treated Unfairly, Advocates
Assert, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2002,at 36 ("[T]he Justice Department has since announced that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service will apply the detention policy to all non-Cubans
who arrive in the United States illegally by sea and will expedite the deportation process for
such migrants").
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administration's stance that Haitians are economic migrants rather
than political refugees. In any case, the policy for Haitians remained
unchanged. 124  Ironically, the Administration's concession to equal
treatment did nothing to benefit Haitians, but instead only harmed
other nationalities. 125  As Representative Alcee Hastings noted:
"They're shutting up those of us up who have argued that their policy
is discriminatory. But it still is inhumane . . . Rather than include
Haitians in a humane policy as existed for everybody but Haitians,
now they put everybody under an inhumane policy.'
126
(c). Detention and its Discontents
Finally, reports have raised a number of concerns about how
Haitian asylum-seekers are being treated during detention. 27 First, the
conditions of detention, in some cases, have been a serious problem.
For example, some of the Haitian women who arrived in the U.S. in
December 2001 were placed in a maximum-security prison for eight
months. 128  While these women were not placed in the main
population, they were treated much as if they were, receiving inedible
food, limited access to the outdoors, and inadequate medical care to
address critical conditions like diabetes.
129
Additionally, the integrity of families was not always preserved
during their detention.' 30 In some cases, the INS separated family
members from one another, including children from their parents.
131
In one such case, the INS separated Jean, a Haitian asylum-seeker,
from his wife and son for three months. 132 After inquiring about his
family, authorities informed Jean that his wife and son were at a
hotel, 133 but failed to inform him of their precise whereabouts.
134
Summing up both the anguish of being taken away from his family as
well as his utter sense of helplessness to do anything about it, Jean
remarked "[w]e've lived together for so long, and this is the first time
we've been separated. But the government has decided, and we can
124. Canedy, supra note 123.
125. See id.
126. U.S. Affirms Uniform Policy for Illegal Immigrants Arriving by Sea, supra note 113.
127. See, e.g., REFUGEE POLICY ADRIFT, supra note 11.
128. Id. at 22.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 26-27.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 26.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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do nothing."' 35 In another case, the INS separated a Haitian girl from
her mother, father, and three brothers. 136  After two months, she
reunited with her mother, but remained separated from her father and
siblings. 37 Eventually, authorities granted asylum to the girl's father
and two of her brothers; nevertheless, the detention facility prevented
them from visiting the girl.' 38 While the INS has denied separating
family members, 39 immigrant advocacy groups like the Women's
Commission have documented, through visits to facilities and
interviews with detainees, that families are being separated.
140
Additionally, the INS denied Haitian asylum seekers access to
attorneys. 141 This access is nearly essential to successfully litigating
an asylum claim. 42  According to a frequently cited Georgetown
University study, an asylum-seeker represented by counsel is four to
six times more likely to receive asylum. 143 Similarly, access to mental
health evaluations is extremely important to proving a "fear" of
persecution (not to mention critical from a purely mental health
perspective). 144
At detention facilities, detainees were unable to consult with
their attorneys in private. 45 In one facility, interviews with clients
were conducted in a large public visitation area.1 46 The INS Miami
District also placed other restrictions on attorneys, such as
unnecessarily "onerous paperwork"-for example, attorneys had to
give 24-hour advance notice every time they wanted to visit a client.
14 7
In terms of access to mental health professionals, one institution flatly
denied access to anyone but its own staff. 48 This was clearly in
conflict with even the INS's own standards: "Psychological
examination by a practitioner or expert not associated with the INS or
the facility can provide a detainee with information useful in
135. Id.
136. Id. at 27.
137. Id
138. Id.
139. Id. at 26.
140. Id. at 26-27.
141. Id. at 27.
142. Id. at 29.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 23.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id. at 23.
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immigration proceedings .. . . Therefore the District Director will
generally approve examinations...,149
Even the INS implicitly recognized its failure to provide
adequate care to detainees-the women previously held in the
maximum-security prison have since been moved to a more hospitable
facility. 5 ° Still, other problems, such as inadequate access to legal
counsel persist.' 5' Additionally, while the INS characterizes its recent
decision to move refugees from prisons to other facilities as an
alternative to detention, the Women's Commission pointed out that the
new facility was merely "an alternativeform of detention."' 152
IV. INS POLICY AS A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Apart from its clear breach of humanitarian principles, the INS
detention policy also violates a number of international laws.
Moreover, as the last section in this part discusses, national security
does not provide a valid justification for the policy's departure from
international standards.
A. Article 31 of the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: Assessing the Viability of Deterrence as an Objective of
Detaining Asylum Seekers
Article 31(1) of the Refugee Convention provides that
countries "shall not impose penalties" on refugees "on account of their
illegal entry or presence."'' 53 Similarly, Article 31(2) stipulates that
countries should not restrict "the movements of ... refugees" beyond
what is necessary.1 54 The rationale behind not imposing penalties on
refugees because of their illegal status seems clear: for those escaping
extreme persecution, the decision to leave one's country to seek refuge
in another is often not a calculated one. Practically speaking, the
delays in obtaining requisite immigration documentation could be the
difference between life and death, or at least between persecution and
refuge. Thus, in ratifying the Refugee Protocol, United Nations
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 24.
152. Id. at 25.
153. Refugee Convention, supra note 6, at 174.
154. Id.
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members, including the U.S., recognized a need for leniency. Present
U.S. policy, however, ignores that need and instead penalizes asylum
seekers in contravention of Article 31 of the Refugee Convention.
According to the present administration, one of the aims in its
policy of detaining asylum seekers is to deter future asylum seekers, at
least those from Haiti. 155  The implication, of course, is that the
detention is a negative consequence-otherwise, it cannot function as
a deterrent. 156  Thus, detention is a penalty so long as one of its
objectives is deterrence of future migration. This conclusion is
consistent with the UNHCR 157 Detention Guidelines:
Detention of asylum seekers which is applied ...as
part of a policy to deter future asylum seekers is
contrary to the principles of international protection.
Under no circumstances should detention be used as a
punitive or disciplinary measure for failure to comply
with administrative requirements or breach of reception
centre or refugee camp or other institutional
restrictions. 1
58
Recently, the UNHCR, relying on Article 31, squarely
addressed the legality of deterrence as a justification for detention. It
determined that "detention... for the purpose of deterrence cannot be
justified.' 59
155. See supra, Part III.C.2.a.
156. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 460 (7th ed. 1999) (defining deterrence, in part, as
"the prevention of criminal behavior by fear of punishment") (emphasis added).
157. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
158. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON DETENTION
FOR ASYLUM SEEKERS 3 [hereinafter DETENTION GUIDELINES], http://www.rcmvs.org/
investigacion/asylum.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2003) (on file with MARGINS:
Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion, Gender and Class).
159. Id.
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B. Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees160
Article 3 of the Refugee Convention states that countries shall
apply the Convention "without discrimination as to race, religion or
country of origin."' 16 1 As noted earlier,' 62 the U.S. policy of detaining
asylum-seekers initially focused on Haitians. Thus, prior to expanding
its policy to cover other nationalities, the policy plainly violated
Article 3.163 By recognizing the policy's unfairness, 64 the Bush
Administration conceded as much and sought to cure this Article 3
problem. 165  The revised policy, however, does not entirely do so.
Rather, at least two problems remain.
First, Haitians arguably remain the target of the policy. In
changing its policy to accommodate allegations of discrimination, 66
the Bush Administration had two options: it could have abandoned the
policy altogether or expanded it to become more uniformly harsh. In
choosing the latter option, the administration may have failed to cure
the discrimination problem. As Cheryl Little explained, "Our
government is changing the rules so they can justify their
discriminatory treatment of Haitians." 67  Indeed, absent some
compelling rationale to the contrary, a reasonable interpretation of the
Administration's policy shift may be that it was simply willing to
sacrifice the welfare of other nationalities to preserve its application to
Haitians. In other words, the focus of the policy remains the Haitian
people; the change in policy was merely an attempt to deflect
criticism. Under this view, the policy fails to shed its discriminatory
animus.' 68
160. Refugee Convention, supra note 5, at 156.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part Ill.C.
163. See supra, Part III.C.2.(b).
164. See Bush Press Conference, supra note 109.
165. See supra Part III.C.
166. Id.
167. Jacqueline Charles & Andrea Elliot, Justice Department to Apply Swifter
Deportation Rules to All Illegal Immigrants, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 9, 2002.
168. This would be akin to the following scenario: State X has a voting law requiring
only Blacks to pass literacy tests because it wants to deter them from voting. State X's major
newspaper runs a story criticizing the law for its discriminatory application. State X, under
pressure from various civil rights groups, confesses to the discriminatory nature of the law,
but rather than removing it, it imposes the law on everyone in the state. In essence, the state
never undoes the action that resulted from its discriminatory animus and thus every indication
is that the animus itself remains. (This, of course, would be especially true if the literacy
requirement had a disproportionate impact on Blacks, even after the requirement was imposed
on everyone. Likewise, given Haiti's proximity to the United States and the substantial
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A second and more obvious problem is the continued
exceptional status of Cubans.' 69  Presently, Cubans, unlike Haitians
and now other nationalities, are not presumptively detained pending
their asylum hearings but can be paroled.1 70 So long as this distinction
is maintained, Article 3 discrimination will continue under current
U.S. immigration policy.
C. Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights'71 : The Right to Be Free From Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights' 72 provides that
"everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" and,
accordingly, that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile."'' 73 These rights were codified in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which states more
specifically that: "Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order
that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
174
Having ratified the ICCPR in 1992,171 the U.S. is obligated to
provide asylum-seekers some degree of process before detaining them.
Presently, however, that is not taking place. Instead, under its current
policy, the INS orders detention, which is not subject to review by
either the judiciary or an outside administrative body.' 76 Rather, in
contravention of the ICCPR, asylum-seekers can be detained for
months or even years without any way to challenge the arbitrary
nature of their detention.1
77
incentives for Haitians to migrate, disproportionality in U.S. asylum policy, even after being
expanded to include all asylum seekers, is likely.).
169. See Cuban Refugees: Adjustment of Status, Pub. L. 89-732, 80 Stat 1161 (1966)
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1255); see also Part III.C.
170. See Cuban Refugees: Adjustment of Status, Pub. L. 89-732, 80 Stat 1161 (1966)
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1255).
171. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
172. GA Res. 217(111), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
173. Id.
174. ICCPR, supra note 171, at 54.
175. ICCPR, supra note 171.
176. ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to
review - (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, other than the
granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title"; see also infra Part V.
177. See Canedy, supra note 123.
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D. Convention on the Rights of the Child78
With the exception of Somalia, the U.S. is presently the only
country that has not signed the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. 179 Given the world's consensus on this particular convention, it
is worth noting that some of its provisions have bearing here. For
instance, Article 9 of the Convention provides that states "shall ensure
that a child not be separated from his or her parents against their will
except when competent authorities, subject to judicial review,
determine that ... [it] is in the best interests of the child."180 Relying
on the Women's Commission report, Part III of this Comment
demonstrated that such determinations are not always being made;
rather, Haitian children are being separated from their families for
extended periods of time without regard to their "best interests."'
' 81
E. National Security as a Justification for the INS Detention Policy
The Justice Department contends that the detention of asylum
seekers is necessary to deter "surges in illegal migration by sea,"
because such surges "threaten national security by diverting valuable
United States Coast Guard and other resources from counter-terrorism
and homeland security responsibilities."18 2  According to guidelines
issued by the UNHCR, national security is an acceptable reason to
detain asylum seekers, 83 However, the U.S.'s use of national security
as a justification for detaining Haitian asylum seekers is "both
disingenuous and troubling." 184
First, the White House itself recognized, in the October 2002
arrival of Haitian refugees, that the very reason the Coast Guard failed
to intercept their boat was because the Haitians did not pose a national
security risk.185 Second, the duties of the Coast Guard are not limited
178. Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1990).
179. Joyce Neu, Final Days Showdown at the U.N., SAN DIEGO TRm., March 16, 2003, at
G1.
180. Convention on the Rights of the Child supra note 178, at art. 9.
181. See supra Part 1II.C.2.(c).
182. Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal under Section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924 (Nov. 13,
2002).
183. See DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 158.
184. LCHR, supra note 92, at 8.
185. Id.
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to national security. A major component of the Coast Guard's mission
is "search and rescue." 186 Other components include "protection of
natural resources" and "maritime mobility," which like "search and
rescue," are distinct from the Coast Guard's "homeland security"
duties. 187 Thus, the Coast Guard is not neglecting its duties in tending
to Haitian refugees. Rather, these operations are a critical part of its
explicit duties.
While the UNHCR indicated that detention is acceptable if it is
necessary for national security, it did not endorse detention as a means
to deter asylum seekers. 188 The UNHCR clearly explained that using
detention as a means of deterrence is "contrary to the principles of
international protection."' 89  Thus, detention for national security
purposes should be limited to those instances where officials have a
legitimate concern about the threat that an individual asylum seeker
might pose because, for instance, the government has reasonable
suspicions or insufficient information about the asylum seeker.' 90 In
the wake of 9/11, the relevance of immigration to national security
should not be underestimated. On the other hand, security ought not to
come at the expense of our most basic humanitarian obligations.'
9 1
V. JEANTY V. BULGER: THE SEEMING IRRELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
The relevance of international law to U.S. immigration policy
depends on the willingness of the INS and other government agencies
to abide by it and, in the event of breach, of the courts to provide
redress. Measured accordingly, Jeanty v. Bulger 192 clearly rendered
international law irrelevant.
186. For a list of U.S. Coast Guard missions see http://www.uscg.mil/USCG.shtm (last
visited July 29, 2003) (on file with MARGINS: Maryland's Law Journal on Race, Religion,
Gender and Class).
187. Id.
188. DETENTION GUIDELINES, supra note 158.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. For additional example of the government's questionable invocation of national
security following 9/11, see George Larder, Jr., More Illegal Immigrants Can Be Held,
Ashcroft's Ruling Cites National Security Issues, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2003, at A6
(discussing Ashcroft's rationale that for indefinite detention of Haitians that Haiti has become
a transit point for terrorists).
192. 204 F.Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2002), affd, 321 F.3d 1336 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("After
a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs and after the benefit of oral argument,
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In Jeanty, four Haitian detainees, who arrived in the U.S. by
boat in December 2001 and were detained pursuant to INS policy,
brought suit on behalf of themselves and all detained Haitian aliens in
the District Court for the Southern District of Florida.' 93  The
detainees requested that the government, among other things, grant
their immediate release and cease using race or nationality as a factor
in adjudicating requests filed by Haitian asylum seekers.' 94 The court,
in rejecting the Haitian detainees' claims, deferred to the executive's
authority to determine U.S. refugee policy:
Paramount within our democratic values is the
separation of powers among the three co-equal
branches of government. The law teaches us that the
power to control a nation's borders is so fundamental to
its sovereignty that we must abide by the lawfully
enacted policy decisions made by the Legislative and
Executive branches . . . . In immigration matters,
neither individuals nor the Court can substitute their
policy perspectives for the judgments made by
Executive officials, based upon facially legitimate and
bona fide reasons...195
The court made brief mention of international law, but only to
demonstrate its apparent irrelevance. The court first addressed the
UNHCR advisory opinion,' 96 which the Petitioners cited as support for
their contention that detention of asylum seekers as a means of
deterrence is inconsistent with the U.S.'s obligations under the 1967
Refugee Protocol. 197  No doubt anticipating the argument that the
Protocol was not self-executing, 198 the detainees refrained from
alleging a cause of action under international law.' 99 Accordingly, the
court declined to address the substance of the UNHCR opinion. 00
we affirm based upon the district court's well-reasoned order of May 17, 2002, within which
each of these issues is comprehensively resolved.").
193. Id. at 1372.
194. Id. Plaintiffs relied primarily on Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), arguing that
it required "the INS to make parole determinations in a non-discriminatory manner without
treating Haitians different than other nationalities." Jeanty, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
195. Jeanty, 204 F.Supp. 2d at 1383-84.
196. Id. at 1370 n. 5.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1370, 1370 n.5.
199. Id. at 1370.
200. Id. at 1370 n.5.
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In addition, the court addressed the argument submitted in an
Amicus Curiae brief by the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights,2 °'
that the INS detention policy violates the ICCPR.2 °2 Again, the court
relied on the fact that no allegation was made to invoke the ICCPR or
any other international law and that the ICCPR, like the Refugee
Protocol, was previously deemed non-self-executing.
20 3
Presently, then, while U.S. refugee policy appears to be in
conflict with international law, this is of little consequence as long as
courts continue to defer so readily to the executive branch on
immigration matters. As it stands, asylum seekers and their advocates
may need to, as the Jeanty court recommended, direct their "cry for
freedom . . .to those representatives of the political branches
responsible for enacting immigration laws and policies. 20 4 However,
given the largely non-majoritarian nature of refugee policy, especially
205as it relates to Haitians, coupled with the
deference the executive branch now enjoys following September 11 th,
one wonders whether the Haitians' "cry" will resound any louder than
that of the Jews a half-century ago.
VI. CONCLUSION: "To THE BROODING SPIRIT OF THE LAW"
206
Legal analysis often depends more on the "extraordinary
plasticity of legal rhetoric, ' 20 7 the ability to use legal reasoning to
manipulate or justify pre-determined ends, than deeper moral
201. Id. at 1371 n.6.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1368.
205. As opposed to, for instance, refugee policy as it relates to Cubans. See Kathie
Klarreich, Detention of Haitian Refugees Stirs Debate, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 4,
2002, at 2 (quoting Cheryl Little, executive director of the Florida Immigrant Advocacy
Center: 'Why aren't Haitians entitled to the same rights as others... [i]s it because they aren't
from a Communist country but a poor black one? And that Haitians in the United States don't
have any political clout?'). Little's reference is a rather obvious one.
206. P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 130 (1987) (quoting Chief Justice Hughes who concluded the above quote as follows:
"to the intelligence of a future day when a later decision may possibly correct the error into
which the dissenting judge believes the court has been betrayed"). This author hopes that the
words of Justice Hughes will one day ring true for the dissent of Justice Blackmun in Sale; see
supra Part III.B.
207. Richard A. Posner, Courting Evil, NEW REPUBLIC, June 17, 1991, at 42.
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judgments. 208  This point is well-illustrated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Sale. In that case, the Court claimed that, while its
decision might have been inconsistent with the "spirit" of human
rights, it was constrained by the plain language of the law. 20 9  Of
course, as Justice Blackmun's dissent implies, the Court merely chose
one of two competing interpretations, the principal difference being
that one focused, in part, on the "spirit" of the law while the other did
not.
2 10
Express international legal obligations clearly prohibit a policy
of detaining asylum seekers for the purpose of deterring others from
seeking asylum. In the often uncertain and fungible world of
international law, however, what seems "clear" to one court or
commentator frequently represents only one of numerous competing
perspectives. There are, of course, articles written on the very subject
addressed in this Comment that take precisely the opposite view of this
211
author. In accepting the "better view" of one author or court over
that of another, one cannot avoid referencing some higher principle,
whether that principle is economic efficiency, national sovereignty,
constitutional principles, 212 or human rights. This Comment has taken
an approach quite like that of Justice Blackmun in Sale by looking to
what the law should be, given its broader purposes.
In many cases, a detached approach to the law may be the best
approach. By its very terms, however, this cannot be the case in
human rights law. After all, it was a profoundly human tragedy that
gave rise to the law of human rights generally and refugee law in
particular. 21 3  By recognizing certain human rights obligations,
208. Id. (Posner describes the "extraordinary plasticity of legal rhetoric" as that "which
enables a judge to find a plausible form of words to clothe virtually any decision, however
barbarous").
209. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 183 (1993).
210. This is a relatively generous evaluation of the Majority's decision in Sale . One
author, for example, characterized the decision as one in which "the Court . . . might
justifiably be accused of engaging in judicial activism of the conservative mode." Thomas
David Jones, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. 113 S. Ct. 2549, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 105,
122 (Keith Highet & George Kahale, III eds., 1994).
211. See, e.g., Matthew A. Pingeton, United States Immigration Policy: Detaining Cuban
Refugees Taken from the Sea, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 329 (1999) (examining the history
of U.S. immigration policy regarding Cubans and the implementation of asylum procedures
for Cubans and other refugees).
212. For example, the executive branch often makes the claim that it has plenary power
over enforcement of U.S. immigration law. For discussion of this position, see Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional
Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990); see also supra Part III.C.
213. See supra Part III.A.
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countries implicitly made a promise not to repeat the mistakes that
contributed to the murder of eleven million people. Those mistakes
were predicated, in part, on detached judgment in which countries like
the U.S. looked more to the economic and political ramifications of
their actions rather than the moral ramifications of inaction.
21 4
A half-century later, the U.S. has yet to learn this historical
lesson. The denial of refuge to Haitians fleeing persecution is, as it
was with Jewish refugees, rooted in political and economic factors-
the rights of Haitians as human beings have become a secondary
matter. Indeed, the plight of Haitians was never genuinely at issue; the
U.S. government recognized, on more than one occasion, the
considerable extent of their suffering.215 Instead, the real question is
whether the U.S. is committed to doing much about it. Increasingly, it
appears that it is not.
Under its detention policy, the present administration does not
merely seek to hedge its obligations to provide asylum; it now seeks to
deter Haitians and possibly other groups from ever seeking asylum in
the first place. In addition to interdiction, this is now done primarily
through detaining Haitian asylum-seekers. Simply stated, the U.S. is
enforcing a policy that detains asylum seekers in the hope that others
who are experiencing persecution will think twice before seeking
refuge in the U.S. At the very least, such a policy undermines the
"spirit" of the Refugee Convention and is an affront to what has long
been this country's pledge: "Give me your tired, your poor, your
huddled masses yearning to breathe free."
An administration that, at least in its rhetoric, has become
increasingly concerned with matters of human rights216  and
214. Id.
215. SeePart lI.C.
216. Invoking the same UNHCR whose guidance regarding detention of refugees his
administration has effectively ignored, Bush, in making his case for action against Iraq, stated
that:
Last year, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights found that
Iraq continues to commit extremely grave violations of human rights and
that the regime's repression is all pervasive. Tens of thousands of political
opponents and ordinary citizens have been subjected to arbitrary arrest
and imprisonment, summary execution, and torture by beating, burning,
electric shock, starvation, mutilation and rape. Wives are tortured in front
of their husbands; children in the presence of their parents; and all of these
horrors are concealed from the world by the apparatus of a totalitarian
State.
U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 2d plen. mtg. at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/57/PV.2 (2002) (address by
President George W. Bush). Later, Bush stated as one of his goals an Iraqi "government
based on respect for human rights ..... Id.
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international law, 217 should reverse its present course before the
"intelligence of a future day" reminds us yet again how tragic the
results of our indifference can be.
217. On the importance of international law, Bush said: "All the world now faces a test
and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to
be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve
the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?" Id. at 8. As to the "purpose" of the
United Nations' "founding," see supra Part Ili.
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